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evolution of IMF 
conditionality 
Sidney Dell* ** 
T h e principle of conditionality has always been at 
the centre of the controversy over the influence the 
International Monetary Fund should wield over na-
tional policies in connexion with its loans, to such a 
point that there were animated arguments on the 
matter during the negotiations to establish the IMF, 
not only between the European countries and the 
United States, but also between various institutions 
within the latter country. 
After briefly describing the controversies of 
those times —in which Keynes played a leading 
part— the author shows how this principle gradually 
took shape through various agreements, until in 1968 
a global decision was taken on drawing rights, 
establishing a procedure which has guided IMF pol-
icy since then. His main concern, however, is not to 
give a history of the principle of conditionality, but 
rather to analyse this principle in order to bring out 
its limitations and defects and thus contribute to the 
review to which it is currently being subjected both 
inside and outside the Fund. 
Among the limitations and defects of the princi-
ple of conditionality, the author emphasizes those 
connected with the evaluation of country perfor-
mance —such as the questionable concept of 
'mismanagement ' , and the stress laid on monetary 
criteria—, the tendency to shift the whole responsi-
bility for solving disequilibria onto the deficit.coun-
tries, the scant concern shown to establish whether 
deficits are of external or internal origin, and the 
imposition of stereotyped stabilization programmes 
in widely varying actual situations. 
The present crisis calls for structural adjust-
ments which, in turn, call for a change in the policy of 
international financial agencies, and such a change 
demands not only larger resources and better condi-
tions of access to loans, but also new criteria for 
appraising performance. In other words, it calls for 
the reformulation of the prevailing principle of 
conditionality. 
* Stall' member of ill»; United Nations Centre on Transnational 
Corporations. 
"""The definitive English edition f'rcitn which this shorter version has 
been prepared is entitled On Being Grandmotherly: The Evolution of IMF 
Conditionality, Essays in International Finance No. 144, Princeton, 
N.J., Princeton University, International Finance Section, October 
1981. A Spanish version of the present article appeared in Ceptil 
Review No. 13 (April 1981). The views expressed in these articles are of 
course those of the author and do not necessarily coincide with those 
of the United Nations Secretariat. 
1. The history 
Writing in January 1944, before the Bretton 
Woods Conference, Lord Keynes described the 
views of the U.S. government on the future 
character of the International Monetary Fund 
as follows: "In their eyes it should have wide 
discretionary and policing powers and should 
exercise something of the same measure of 
grandmotherly influence and control over the 
central banks of the member countries, that 
these central banks in turn are accustomed to 
exercise over the other banks within their own 
countries" (Moggridge, 1980, Vol. 25, p. 404). 
This view was not accepted by most of the 
other countries participating in the negotia-
tions to establish the IMF. At a meeting of sev-
enteen countries held in Atlantic City at the 
end of June 1944 the U.S. delegation proposed 
that the draft Article of Agreement dealing with 
the use of Fund resources should entitle the 
Fund to determine, as a pre-condition for au-
thorizing a drawing on its resources, that such 
resources were to be used by the country con-
cerned for purposes and policies consistent 
with the Agreement. 
Keynes contested this view and said that 
countries must have an unqualified right to 
purchase foreign exchange within the pre-
scribed quantitative limits, subject to the provi-
sions of the Fund Agreement. He therefore 
favoured a wording of the Article which would 
make it clear that the decision on a drawing 
would be that of the member country, not of the 
Fund. 
The U.K. position on this matter was sup-
ported by other delegations. Leslie G. Mel-
ville, speaking for Australia, took the view that 
a central bank must be certain that the re-
sources it had counted upon would be available 
as required. J.W. Beyen of the Netherlands 
considered that there should be no question of 
having to convince the Fund on such matters 
and that the wording proposed by the United 
States was "impossible". 
In the event, the wording proposed by the 
United States was not included in the final text 
of the Bretton Woods Agreement, and most 
countries therefore probably ratified the Agree-
ment in the belief that British views on con-
ditionality had prevailed and that the Fund 
would have no right to challenge a drawing by a 
member country that gave an undertaking that 
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the resources drawn would be used to effect 
payments consistent with the Agreement. 
Another point of some interest is that, 
strong as the position of the United States on the 
principle of conditionality undoubtedly was, 
its objectives were clearly limited at this time. 
Members of the U.S. delegation at Bretton 
Woods might have been surprised if they could 
have peered into the future and read the text of 
a typical I M F standby arrangement. In inter-
governmental discussions, the U.S. negotiators 
repeatedly emphasized that "no restrictions 
should be imposed [by the Fund] unless mis-
behaviour is flagrant", as White, the leader of 
the U.S. delegation, had put it at a meeting in 
October 1943. For example: 
The Fund 's facilities should not be used to 
finance either a flight of capital or the issue of 
foreign loans by a country which could not af-
ford to undertake foreign lending. Again, the 
F u n d would be justified in intervening where a 
country was using its quota for rearmament. On 
the other hand, ¿f would not be justified in the case of 
an unbalanced budget. In general the Fund would 
intervene only in extreme cases of violation of qualita-
tive rules, and would bear the burden of proof ^  [em-
phasis supplied]. (Horsefield, 1969, p. 69.) 
Similarly, at a private meeting held to brief 
the U.S. delegation on July 11944, there was no 
suggestion by any of the participants that the 
Fund ' s conditions for drawings would be oner-
ous. A striking remark by White was, "I don't 
think the Fund should butt into every country's 
business and say 'We don't like this or that' ". 
On the latter point, the wording of Article 
IV, Section 5(f) of the original IMF Agreement 
is of particular interest. This subparagraph 
stated that, so long as the Fund was satisfied 
that a change in the par value of a particular 
member ' s currency was necessary to correct a 
fundamental disequilibrium, "it shall not ob-
ject to a proposed change because of the 
domestic social or political policies of the 
member proposing the change". This wording 
(as pointed out to the author by E.M. Bernstein) 
makes it clear that the intention of the Agree-
ment as a whole was to preclude Fund interfer-
ence with domestic policies having social ob-
jectives such as the subsidization of food or 
other essential consumption goods for the pro-
tection of low-income groups. 
The early years of the fund 
T h e United States was fully aware that the bat-
tle for a "grandmotherly" Fund had not been 
won at Bretton Woods. Once the Fund was a 
going concern, however, its Executive Board 
might be persuaded to introduce the imple-
menting regulations or interpretations neces-
sary to give the institution supervisory func-
tions. Without such safeguards, the United 
States would not agree to the release of Fund 
resources. At a meeting of the Board in May 
1946, the U.K. Executive Director, George 
Bolton, put forward his view of the "semi-
automatic character of Fund facilities". The 
U.S. Executive Director, Harry White, on the 
other hand, while conceding that the text of the 
Articles of Agreement did not specifically au-
thorize the Fund to exercise supervision, con-
sidered that there would have to be some check 
on the right of a Fund member to draw. He 
suggested that all applications in excess of a 
ceiling figure, to be determined later, should 
come before the Board for comment and 
decision.1 
Speaking for Canada, Louis Rasminsky, la-
ter Governor of the Central Bank of Canada 
from 1961 to 1973, argued that the Fund could 
not operate if every transaction were to be re-
garded as an application to the Board. If a 
member gave the necessary guarantees and 
carried out its undertakings in good faith; it 
must be able to use its quota with assurance. 
Quantitative limitations on drawings had al-
ready been set out clearly in the Articles of 
Agreement, and if a member was fulfilling its 
undertakings by not purchasing foreign ex-
change for purposes inconsistent with the Arti-
cles, it should not be questioned. The Fund 
should be aware of the behaviour of members 
and should be prepared to be courageous in its 
criticisms. But large-scale drawings should be 
regarded as no more than danger signals (PRO 
Treasury File 236/1162). 
In a statement to the Executive Board on 
29 August 1946, that Managing Director 
Camille Gutt, said that the Fund could be con-
t e legram from Balfour to Foreign 'Office, 28 May 
1946, U.K. Public Record Office (subsequently referred to 
as PRO), Treasury File 236/1162. 
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sidered as "a sort of automatic machine selling 
foreign exchange to members within certain 
limits and on certain terms, and repurchasing 
this foreign exchange within certain limits and 
on certain terms". The Fund could, however, 
issue warnings to members and, in certain 
circumstances, declare a member ineligible to 
draw. In Gutt's view, an Executive Board, com-
posed of high-level officials was required not 
so much for the discharge of such functions as 
to constitute "a most important monetary 
policy-making body, consulted by and advising 
its members during the critical periods they 
may pass through" (PRO Treasury File 
236/1162). 
In November 1946, a report to the Bank of 
England by the U.K. Executive Director stated: 
"For the time being there is no reason to fear a 
policy of persistent and irresponsible interfer-
ence in the domestic affairs of members" (PRO 
Foreign Office File 371/62340). As late as 
September 1947, the Treasury brief for the U.K. 
delegation attending the second Annual Meet-
ing of the Board of Governors of the IMF sug-
gested that the "battle for 'automaticity' may be 
largely regarded as won" and pointed out the 
failure of the United States to have the French 
economic situation discussed by the Execu-
tive Board before allowing additional French 
drawings (PRO Treasury File 236/1174). 
But the situation was in reality quite differ-
ent. The Europeans had the best of the argu-
ment, perhaps, but it was the United States that 
had the resources, and it was resources that 
counted, especially in the immediate aftermath 
of World War II. By 1950, the Fund had come 
to a complete standstill, there being no draw-
ings at all in that year. As the Fund history 
points out, "Many people, both inside the 
Fund and in member countries, were disturbed 
at the small extent to which drawings were 
being made available to assist member 
countries in the kind of difficulties which the 
Articles had envisaged" (Horsefield, 1969, 
p. 276).3 
2 I t is ironic that in 1974-1979 the Fund again reached a 
position in which it was often unable to "assist member 
countries in the kind of difficulties which the Articles had 
envisaged" —this time because of too much conditionality 
rather than too little. In a letter to the author, Sir George 
Bolton, U.K. Executive Director from 1946 to 1952, writes 
Deploring "the current tendency to write 
off the Fund as moribund", Gutt made a prop-
osal in November 1950 to break the deadlock 
by linking drawings to an undertaking by mem-
bers to adopt specific steps to overcome 
balance-of-payments difficulties. The legality 
of this proposal was immediately challenged 
by European and other members of the Execu-
tive Board. In the end, however, only France 
and the United Kingdom withheld their ap-
proval, the remaining countries considering, as 
the Fund history puts it, that the Managing 
Director's plan "offered a useful technique for 
enabling members to resume drawing from the 
Fund" (Horsefield, 1969, p. 281). 
Similarly, an earlier proposal by the 
United States to establish a maximum period of 
five years for the repayment of drawings was 
adopted despite initial opposition, on legal as 
well as policy grounds, by most members of the 
Executive Board (Horsefield, éd., 1969, Vol. 2, 
pp. 399-400). The view of the Fund staff on this 
matter was that the Board had no legal authority 
to set a term for repayment of drawings unless it 
distinguished between members. If at the time 
of drawing it seemed to the Board inherently 
likely that repayment could be made reason-
ably soon, the Board had no power to impose 
conditions. If such repayment could not be 
foreseen, the proper course was to refuse to 
allow the member to draw at all (Horsefield, 
1969, p. 278). 
Thus, it was a desire to enlist the co-
operation of the United States as the principal 
source of credit that prompted other Fund 
members to give way to American views on the 
question of conditionality, rather than any con-
viction on their part that adoption of the U.S. 
concept of conditionality was indispensable for 
a successfully functioning IMF. As the former 
General Counsel of the Fund. Sir Joseph Gold, 
wryly put it: "The [Executive Board's] decision 
of 13 February 1952 [adopting the principle of 
conditionality] was intended to reinvigorate 
the Fund by encouraging members to believe 
that after the collapse of sterling convertibility in 1947, the 
activities of the Fund appeared to be a "stonewalling op-
eration designed to protect the American reserves from be-
ing too heavily drawn upon as a result of Fund operations". 
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that they would be able to use its resources" 
(Horsefield, éd., 1969, Vol. 2, p. 524). 
The substance of conditionality 
T h e main concern of the Fund has been to 
protect the revolving character of its resources, 
and it was this consideration that prompted the 
adoption of the three- to five-year limit for 
repayment of drawings. Linked to the capacity 
to repay, of course, is the need for the country 
concerned to adopt policies and measures that 
will he lp to restore and maintain balance-of-
payments equilibrium. 
Such policies and measures have in the 
past focused on the restoration of a balance 
be tween the aggregate demand for and aggre-
gate supply of resources, making use of mone-
tary and fiscal policies to this end. Where the 
balance-of-payments problem was thought to 
b e due in part to distortions in the price struc-
ture, the measures required for re-establishing 
equil ibrium might be held to include changes 
in exchange rates, interest rates, and other 
prices and incomes. Limitations on the accu-
mulation of new foreign debt might also have to 
be considered. 
From 1952 onward, the standby arrange-
men t was developed as the main instrument for 
conditionality applicable to drawings beyond 
the first credit tranche. Two stages in the evo-
lution of standby arrangements may be noted. 
In 1956, phasing was introduced; in other 
words, drawings were authorized in install-
ments over a period of time, each installment 
be ing approved in the light of satisfactory per-
formance by the drawing country. Binding per-
formance conditions evolved gradually, begin-
ning in 1958. In that year, a drawing by Para-
guay was made conditional on observance of a 
credit ceiling and of maximum commitment 
levels for budget expenditure and public works 
programmes. When this matter was reviewed 
in the Executive Board, the Executive Director 
for the United Kingdom asked that it be re-
corded that the performance conditions re-
qui red of Paraguay on this occasion should not 
be regarded as a precedent for general applica-
tion (Horsefield, éd., 1969, Vol. 2, p. 485). In 
1959, Haiti committed itself to a broader range 
of policy conditions, and this time several 
Executive Directors expressed reservations. 
These developments were followed by 
further elaboration of performance conditions. 
As the Fund history puts it, "There has been a 
tendency toward the proliferation of specific 
limitations and targets" (Horsefield, éd., 1969, 
Vol. 2, p . 486). 
In September 1968 the Executive Board 
decided that the number of performance cri-
teria to be applied in cases of drawings beyond 
the first credit tranche should be limited to 
those considered truly necessary for deter-
mining whether the objectives of a member's 
stabilization programme were being achieved. 
2. The issues 
Conditionality and the access to resources 
An obvious question is whether any useful 
purpose is served by reviving the old debates 
about automaticity and conditionality. There is 
now no disagreement among governments, 
whether from developed or developing coun-
tries, on the broad principle of conditionality in 
the Fund. Moreover, an amendment to the 
Fund ' s Articles of Agreement adopted in 1969 
explicitly recognizes the principle of condi-
tionality. 
It is nevertheless useful, at a time when the 
application of the principle of conditionality is 
be ing re-examined inside as well as outside the 
IMF, to bear in mind that there is a role for both 
conditional and unconditional resources with-
in the Fund, and that there are compelling 
reasons for a major increase in the proportion of 
resources made available unconditionally or at 
low conditionality. These reasons will be set 
out in the course of the following discussion. 
Another reason for going back over the his-
torical record is the startling similarity between 
the views held today by developing-country 
members of the Fund and the views that were 
be ing vigorously advocated by the Europeans 
at a time when they, too, had to face major 
balance-of-payments pressures of a structural 
character. If the monetary authorities of coun-
tries such as France, the Netherlands, and the 
United Kingdom would like to gain a better 
understanding of the current insistence by de-
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veloping countries on the need for access to a 
larger volume of unconditional resources, they 
have only to look back at their own files and 
position papers of the early postwar period. 
What was sauce for the goose in the late 1940s 
and early 1950s should, perhaps, be sauce for 
the gander in the 1980s. 
Particularly noteworthy was the view of 
deficit countries then, as now, that the propor-
tion of resources to be provided by the Fund 
unconditionally or at low conditionality ought 
to bear a direct relationship to the size of total 
Fund resources available to members. The 
British (Keynes) plan for a Clearing Union had 
envisaged total quotas of the order of US$ 30 
billion or more, equivalent to one half or more 
of world imports. The United States proposal 
adopted at Bretton Woods, on the other hand, 
was for aggregate quotas of US$ 10 billion. In 
particular cases, of course, quota limitations 
could be set aside by a waiver procedure. But in 
global terms, at the lower level of quotas pro-
posed by the United States, it became much 
more important, in Keynes's view, to provide 
for a larger unconditional element in drawing 
rights on the Fund. Otherwise countries would 
not have the assurance they needed that, in 
case of necessity they would have access to a 
sufficient volume of balance-of-payments 
support to give them a minimal degree of free-
dom of action in their economic policies. 
Similar considerations apply a fortiori to the 
present situation in the IMF. While IMF quo-
tas averaged about 16 per cent of total imports 
in 1948, the proportion had fallen to less than 3 
per cent in 1980. For non-oil-developing coun-
tries the percentage was a little higher —be-
tween 4 and 5 per cent. The proportion of quota 
now available unconditionally, or at low condi-
tionality, includes not only the reserve tranche 
and the first credit tranche, but also drawings 
under the combined compensatory financing 
and cereal import facility of up to 125 per cent 
of quota. (Drawings for the financing of buffer 
stocks are also available at low conditionality.) 
The combined facility, however, deals only 
with balance-of-payments difficulties due to 
export shortfalls or to excess import costs for 
cereals, and many other factors outside the con-
trol of these countries —such as increases in 
import prices for commodities other than cere-
als—can exert balance-of-payments présure. 
On the whole, therefore, the capacity of the 
Fund to provide balance-of-payments support 
to developing countries unconditionally, or at 
low conditionality, has declined substantially. 
At the same time, drawings in the upper credit 
tranches are subject to stringent conditions. 
Such expansion of Fund resources as has taken 
place recently, as noted below, has added to the 
lending capacity of the Fund only at high con-
ditionality, while the low-conditionality re-
sources previously available through the oil 
facility and from sales of gold have come to an 
end. 
It is true that balance-of-payments financ-
ing is also provided by commercial banks. But 
this is available only to a limited number of 
developing countries, and generally not to the 
poorest or (by commercial-bank standards) 
least creditworthy among them. The com-
mercial banks did play a useful role in meeting 
the need for balance-of-payments support in 
the'1970s at a time when no alternative sources 
were available on the scale required, and now 
that such financing has been widely accepted, 
it is likely to continue, though not necessarily 
in the volume or on the terms that borrowing 
countries would consider desirable. But com-
mercial-bank financing should not be regarded 
as a substitute for adequate resources in the 
Fund, especially in view of the inability of 
many Fund members to obtain access to private 
capital markets for balance-of-payments sup-
port. 
Conditionality and the burden of adjustment 
As is well known, the distribution of the burden 
of adjustment tends to be highly inequitable as 
between countries. During the Great Depres-
sion, the term "beggar-my-neighbour" was 
used to describe the policies whereby countries 
sought to shift the burden of adjustment to one 
another, and it was generally the stronger 
countries that achieved the greatest success. In 
recent times, strong international pressure has 
frequently been brought to bear upon deficit 
countries, while surplus countries have been 
under little or no pressure to adjust. 
Clearly, the situation of a country whose 
deficit is merely the mirror image of a structural 
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surplus elsewhere in the system is vastly diffe-
rent from that of a country in which domestic 
expenditure is excessive. There are no rational 
grounds for compelling the former country to 
undergo all the rigours of standard üpper-
credit-tranche conditionality. On the contrary, 
precisely because of its inability to carry out the 
mandate of the Articles of Agreement in rela-
tion to surplus countries, the Fund might be 
expected to lean over backward to ease the 
difficulties of countries that are suffering the 
effects of that shortcoming. The Fund cannot, 
of course, supply more resources than are avail-
able to it. But, subject to that constraint, there is 
much that the Fund can do to lighten the 
burden of adjustment and avoid the application 
of severe measures, especially of a deflationary 
character. 
The Fund, however, has rejected the idea 
that the origin of a deficit should be taken into 
account in determining the degree of condi-
tionality imposed. In justifying this position, it 
is pointed out that both internal and external 
factors may be present in many situations. 
Moreover it is suggested that in terms of adjust-
ment a more important consideration is wheth-
er the imbalance is transitory, and therefore 
self-reversing, or is likely to persist. If it is like-
ly to persist, the country will need to undertake 
adjustment regardless of the internal or exo-
genous character of the deficit. 
This reasoning is valid but incomplete. It 
is quite true that in real life a balance-of-
payments deficit may have elements of both 
internal and external origin and that, where the 
deficit is persistent, adjustment is inescapable. 
But it is also true that, within the resources 
available to it, the Fund has sufficient degrees 
of freedom in the application of conditionality 
to be able to distinguish between a country 
whose deficit is mainly self-generated and a 
country whose deficit is mainly due to external 
factors. In particular, there is no reason why a 
country that has already sustained a decline in 
real income because of a deterioration in terms 
of trade for reasons beyond its control should 
be called upon to lower its income still further 
by means of devaluation or fiscal and monetary 
contraction unless there are specific indica-
tions of a genuine need for such measures. The 
Fund should seek rather to support the kind of 
solution that is consistent with an expansion of 
output and employment. 
Conditionality and self-generated imbalance 
There are reasons for questioning the Fund's 
methods of applying the principle of condition-
ality even in conventional cases where 
countries themselves are primarily responsible 
for their balance-of-payments difficulties —for 
example, where there is excess pressure of 
domestic demand.3 So far as the diagnosis of 
problems of imbalance is concerned, the Fund 
history has itself pointed to the questions that 
arise regarding the validity and applicability of 
the monetarist approach to the balance of 
payments employed by the Fund (de Vries, 
1976, p. 368). There are also dangers inherent 
in the characteristic effort of stabilization pro-
grammes to sum up the economic performance 
of a country in terms of a few monetary aggre-
gates. Moreover, the use of quantitative mone-
tary targets as performance criteria tends to de-
termine the character of the adjustment to be 
undertaken even though other forms of adjust-
ment may be more appropriate. 
Fund programmes often include measures 
to liberalize trade and payments and the de-
valuation of exchange rates. Yet there are many 
cases in which the wisdom of such measures is 
open to serious doubt. As two members of the 
Fund staff have put the matter: 
Where trade flows are responsive to price 
factors (as, for example, for developing 
countries which have a substantial man-
ufacturing sector) there is more likely to be 
a balance of advantage in rate flexibility. 
...In other cases, however, where trade 
flows are not very responsive to exchange 
rate changes (because export prices are de-
termined in world markets and there are no 
close domestic substitutes for imports), the 
exchange rate changes needed to secure 
equilibrium in the balance of payments 
will be large. For these countries, the re-
percussions of exchange rate variability on 
3For a fuller treatment of this subject, see Dell and 
Lawrence, 1980, Chap. 3. 
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domestic objectives, such as investment 
promotion and income distribution, may 
be a more potent factor on the negative 
side. (Crocket and Nsouli, 1977.) 
For countries whose exports consist 
mainly of primary products, moreover, it can-
not be assumed that an increased share of the 
market can invariably be obtained by cutting 
export prices in terms of foreign currency, with 
or without devaluation. Any such move is 
bound to put pressure on other producers to 
retaliate in defence of their own market shares. 
T h e result is a loss for all producers, and this 
loss is aggravated where a series of devalua-
tions leads to a rise in the output of primary 
products and hence a further deterioration in 
the terms of trade. Devaluation is justified only 
where domestic costs have risen so high that it 
has become unprofitable to export traditional 
primary commodities, or where dropping the 
exchange rate can reasonably be expected to 
generate a major expansion in non-traditional 
exports, particularly manufactures. 
The liberalization of trade restrictions is 
another policy approach that should not be in-
sisted on indiscriminately. The case for main-
taining and even reinforcing trade controls is 
particularly strong where a country would 
otherwise be forced into substantial deflation 
and unemployment as a means of reducing im-
ports, when the same goal could be achieved 
with a lesser decline in real income and em-
ployment through the use of trade controls. 
Even in the many situations where 
member countries themselves prefer to rely on 
decision-making by market forces, the use of 
pinpoint monetary targets raises serious dif-
ficulties. The setting of such targets is far from 
be ing as scientific a process as is usually im-
pl ied in the literature on this subject, particu-
larly in view of the historical evidence cited by 
the I M F staff itself. The evidence does not sup-
port the presumption that the velocity of circu-
lation of money remains steady when domestic 
credit is manipulated for policy purposes (see 
F leming and Boissonneault, 1977, and Park, 
1970). There is also the practical difficulty that 
the evidence shows that huge errors in short-
term forecasting are commonplace even in re-
gard to monetary aggregates presumed to be 
under government control, let alone when 
deal ing with the private sector. 
It is true that programme ceilings can be, 
and often are, modified by the Fund to take 
account of unforeseen events or incorrect as-
sumptions. But frequently this cannot be done 
until after the mistaken targets have been in 
operation for some time and significant damage 
has already occurred. Analysis of recent experi-
ence of monetary targets in industrially de-
veloped countries with advanced statistical un-
derpinning has shown the extraordinary dif-
ficulties that arise even in selecting and 
quantifying the appropriate monetary target, 
let alone in exercising the control required to 
achieve that target. The Governor of the Bank 
of England is among those who have been 
sharply critical of procedures that require a par-
ticular numerical target to be reached by a par-
ticular date (Bank of England, 1978). An impor-
tant statement dealing with this matter and 
enti t led "Measures to Combat Inflation" was 
issued on 14 April 1981 by the Group of 30. 
This non-official group of leading bankers, 
central bankers, economists, and businessmen, 
meet ing under the chairmanship of Johannes 
Witteveen, former Managing Director of the 
I M F , expressed the view that "It is perhaps 
t ime to review critically recent experience with 
the use of strict quantitative targets for growth 
in the money supply, whether it is broadly or 
narrowly defined". 
In some cases, it is felt that the situation 
calls for shock treatment in the form of a drastic 
change in the exchange rate or a major cutback 
in real income. Where economic chaos appears 
imminent, such treatment may be almost un-
avoidable. Mpreover, if internal political and 
social relationships are cohesive, such mea-
sures may be accepted without political up-
heaval. But there are at least as many cases in 
which such cohesion is lacking, so that shock 
treatment may be compatible only with au-
thoritarian goverment. In such cases, interna-
tional pressure for drastic measures may have 
consequences that are incompatible with other 
international objectives. 
Conditionality and externally generated imbalance 
If there is a need for reconsideration of certain 
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features of traditional stabilization programmes 
even in cases of self-generated imbalance, 
the validity of such programmes is still more 
quest ionable where balance-of-payments 
problems are of external origin or of a structural 
nature. 
T h e Fund 's Annual Report for 1979 (p. 23) 
noted that the entire increase in the balance-of-
payments deficit of non-oil-developing coun-
tries from 1977 to 1979, estimated at some 
US$ 22 billion, was due to two factors: the de-
terioration in terms of trade and the rise in the 
cost of servicing external debt. Both of these 
developments were the result of forces outside 
the control of the developing countries con-
cerned, including the mounting export prices 
of the industrial and oil-exporting countries 
and the increases in interest rates associated 
with efforts by the industrial countries to curb 
inflation by means of monetary restrictions. 
The situation in 1979-1981 is reminiscent 
of that in 1974-1975. At that time, too, develop-
ing countries, as well as many developed 
countries, encountered very large deficits in 
their balances of payments, owing mainly to a 
deterioration in terms of trade. 
In its communiqué of 13 June 1974, the 
Commit tee of 20 noted: 
As a result of inflation, the energy situa-
tion, and other unsettled conditions, many 
countries are experiencing large current ac-
count deficits that need to be financed... 
Sustained co-operation would be needed to en-
sure appropriate financing without endanger-
ing the smooth functioning of private financial 
markets and to avert the danger of adjustment action 
that merely shifts the problem to other countries [em-
phasis supplied]. (Committee of 20, 1974, 
p . 221.) 
These were the considerations underlying 
the decision to establish an oil facility to pro-
vide balance-of-payments support at low con-
ditionality in 1974-1975. Any Fund member 
drawing on the oil facility was required "to 
co-operate with the Fund to find appropriate 
solutions for its balance of payments problem". 
This was the same level of conditionality that 
was applicable to the compensatory financing 
facility. 
Very similar considerations apply to the 
situation in 1981-1982. Here again, the recent 
upsurge in oil prices, coupled with general in-
flation, has had a major effect on the balances of 
payments of a large number of countries. And 
once more, as in 1974-1975, it is important that 
deficit countries not adopt policies that merely 
aggravate the problems of other countries. But 
whi le in 1974-1975 it was- recognized that 
countries incurring balance-of-payments defi-
cits due to oil price increases should not be 
forced into immediate adjustment, in 1981-
1982 the resources provided by the Fund bring 
with them all the rigours of upper-credit-
tranche conditionality. Yet it is as true in 1981-
1982 as it was in 1974-1975 that the inevitable 
outcome of forcing excessive retrenchment on 
deficit countries while the surpluses of oil-
exporting countries are maintained is that 
deficits are simply shifted from country to 
country. The cumulative deflation brought 
about by the adjustment process is thereby 
superimposed on, and reinforces, the primary 
deflation resulting from business recession in 
the industrial countries. 
Adjustment to the new increases in oil 
prices, in any real and lasting sense, cannot be 
achieved within a short period of time. The 
kind of shock treatment often considered advis-
able in cutting back excess demand is virtually 
useless in current circumstances, which call for 
the adaptation of the economy to a new level of 
the energy terms of trade. 
Objectives of the developing countries 
Since 1978, the Fund has come under strong 
pressure from the developing countries to 
liberalize its conditions for lending. There was 
a widespread feeling among developing 
countries that the quota resources available in 
the Fund were too small to justify the consider-
able changes in economic plans and policies 
that might have to be made in order to be al-
lowed to draw on them, except as a last resort in 
circumstances leaving no other option. A rela-
tionship therefore existed between the willing-
ness of countries to accept Fund conditions and 
the amount of resources that the Fund was able 
to make available to them. By the same token, 
the larger the resources that could be provided 
and the longer the period over which they 
could be made available, the less abrupt did the 
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adjustment process have to be and the less ex-
acting the conditions imposed. 
The Fund has responded to the represen-
tations made by the developing countries, no-
tably through the Group of 24, by modification 
of its lending programmes. As the Managing 
Director pointed out: 
Traditionally, a member using the Fund's 
ordinary resources used to be able to borrow 
from us a maximum cumulative amount equal 
to 100 per cent of its quota in the Fund. As 
circumstances have changed, we have progres-
sively adopted policies whereby a member 
may now draw on ordinary resources and on 
resources borrowed by the Fund up to a 
cumulat ive amount of 600 per cent of its quota. 
In 1980 alone the Fund 's new lending commit-
ments under adjustment-programmes agreed 
with members reached SDR 7.2 billion, more 
than double the average level of the three pre-
ceding years. (IMF Survey, 9 Feb. 1981, p. 35.)4 
The Fund also recognized that pressures 
on the balance of payments of developing 
countries under current conditions called for 
structural changes in the economy, involving, 
for example, the need to economize on oil 
and develop additional sources of energy. 
T h e Managing Director acknowledged that 
structural changes of this type may take longer 
than the one to three years normally set as the 
length of Fund programmes. "Thus, while we 
cont inue to stress the importance of ap-
propriate demand management, we now 
systematically emphasize the development of 
the productive base of the economy and we 
contemplate that countries may, therefore, 
need our financing for longer periods." (IMF 
Survey, 9 Feb. 1981, p. 35.) 
Despite the foregoing, there is no doubt 
that the conditions now required by the Fund 
4 The 600 per cent limit does not take into account 
drawings under the compensatory and buffer-stock financ-
ing facilities, or outstanding drawings under the oil 
facilities. New guidelines on the scale of Fund assistance to 
m e m b e r countries following the completion of quota in-
creases under the Seventh General Review provided, gen-
erally, for members to have an annual access to Fund re-
sources of up to 150 per cent of their new quotas, or up to 
450 per cent over a three-year period. For a complete re-
view of the financial facilities of the Fund, see IMFJSurvey, 
Supplement on the Fund (May 1981), pp. 6-10. 
in connexion with the balance-of-payments 
support it is providing are, on average, much 
more stringent than they were at a similar 
period during the mid-1970s. In the words of 
the Managing Director: 
In the period following the first oil shock, 
approximately three-quarters of the resources 
provided by the Fund to its members were 
made available on terms involving a low de-
gree of conditionality. At present, by contrast, 
some three-quarters of our new lending com-
mitments involve "upper credit tranche" pro-
grammes, that is to say, they require rigorous 
adjustment policies. (IMF Survey, 9 Feb. 1981, 
p . 35.) 
Some tentative conclusions 
T h e new concepts of the IMF management 
represent an important step forward, indicating 
a readiness to re-examine some of the basic 
assumptions underlying the Fund's treatment 
of stabilization programmes in the past. At the 
same time, additional clarification will be 
needed before the new ideas can be translated 
into operational guidelines. One suspects that 
particular difficulty will be encountered in 
establishing performance criteria in line with 
the new concepts. For example, the most im-
portant single performance criterion in most, if 
not all, standby arrangements of the past was a 
ceiling on the net domestic assets of the central 
bank or the banking system, accompanied usu-
ally by a subceiling for credit supplied to the 
government by the central bank or the banking 
system. 
The monitoring of country performance in 
terms of compliance with a set of quantitative 
targets is a traditional element in IMF supervi-
sion of stabilization programmes. It cannot 
readily be adapted to a different kind of 
approach in which structural adjustment rather 
than the curtailment of effective demand is the 
basic objective. There may well be a tendency 
for the Fund to continue relying on indicators 
of demand management even in situations 
where the primary objective of a stabilization 
programme is quite different. Even where the 
need for structural adjustment is recognized, 
there appears to be a tendency to emphasize 
the importance of pricing policies, exchange 
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rates, and tax regimes as against more direct 
measures such as the sectoral allocation of 
investment. 
Certainly, structural adjustment does not 
lend itself to the kind of quantitative measure-
ment and pinpoin targetry that the money sup-
ply does. To the extent that the Fund engages 
in a new type of balance-of-payments support, 
new methods of monitoring will be needed 
accordingly. 
T h e idea advanced above that a reasonable 
balance shouïd be struck between the low-
conditional and high-conditional resources 
provided by the IMF is fully consistent with 
the credit-tranche policies of the Fund itself 
—policies that have been distorted by the fail-
ure of the Fund membership to raise quotas in 
l ine with world trade. Such a balance is also 
essential as a means of giving developing coun-
tries at least some of the freedom of manoeuvre 
in the management of their economies that de-
veloped countries have under similar condi-
tions. It is not in the interests of the interna-
tional community that developing countries 
should be continually hemmed in by the policy 
prescriptions of an international organization, 
however well meant those prescriptions may 
be . Developing countries should have access to 
balance-of-payments support, especially in 
cases of externally generated imbalance, on 
conditions that are appropriate to their 
circumstances. This is not an argument for un-
conditional Fund programmes but for forms of 
conditionality that are clearly adapted to the 
specific character of the imbalances en-
countered. 
Finally, the distribution of the burden of 
adjustment among countries cannot be 
separated from the question of responsibility 
for the factors making adjustment necessary. 
This basic idea was written into the Fund's 
Articles of Agreement in the form of the scarce-
currency clause. It was this fundamental con-
cept, likewise, that animated the Committee of 
20's at tempt to find an objective means of de-
termining the distribution of adjustment obli-
gations as between surplus and deficit coun-
tries, as well as between the reserve centre and 
the rest of the world. 
A passive attitude to the distribution of the 
burden of adjustment is by no means the same 
as an impartial or objective attitude. To suggest 
that, regardless of whether a disturbance is of 
domestic or foreign origin, it is the deficit 
country that must accept the full burden of ad-
justment is to settle the question of responsibil-
ity as decisively as if the matter had been ad-
dressed directly instead of indirectly. Such an 
atti tude is tantamount to saying that those 
countries that have the power to shift the 
burden are entitled to do so. And it is precisely 
this approach that in the 1970s resulted in the 
imposition of a burden of adjustment on the 
poorest and weakest countries out of all propor-
tion to their responsibility for the dise-
quilibrium that had arisen. 
The step forward that the Fund manage-
ment has taken in its latest thinking contains 
the potential for one of the most important and 
constructive changes in IMF policy since Bret-
ton Woods. But the word "potential" should be 
stressed, because for the time being it is mainly 
concepts that have been developed, and those 
concepts have not yet been translated fully into 
practical action. The shift in approach is signif-
icant and the importance of structural adjust-
ment in solving balance-of-payments problems 
has been acknowledged, but the new thinking 
does not yet fully accept the proposition that 
the difference between internally and exter-
nally generated disturbances is a crucial factor 
in assessing the form and content of conditional-
ity required. While the Fund management has 
received the support of governments in its ef-
fort to provide larger volumes of balance-of-
payments financing over longer periods, there 
is a reluctance to make any significant changes 
in conditionality. In fact, in global terms there 
has been a step backward; on average, re-
sources are being provided at a much more 
exacting level of conditionality today than they 
were in the mid-1970s, even though the prob-
lems confronted in the two periods are very 
much alike. 
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